GUEST COLUMN, John Richard Schrock, Library Frontlines
Despite China’s clear and 12-point detailed call for a cease fire in Ukraine, the U.S. is portraying China as a supposed supporter of Russia’s war by way of China’s trade including so-called “dual use” tools, nuts-and-bolts, standard computer chips used in cell phones and a wide range of equipment, etc.
There are two issues involved. The first is how World Trade Organization’s prior (but now inoperable) methods of resolving international trade disputes has now weaponized commercial trade for political and wartime purposes. That complex problem will have to wait for a more detailed discussion.
But the second issue is the nature of “dual use” products. Judi Sture, author of “The Ethics and Biosecurity Toolkit for Scientists” published by World Scientific in 2017 is the authority on “dual use.” In nine chapters, Sture details what should be the responsibilities of science researchers, the problems of defining dual use, and the world’s hope of preventing biological and chemical warfare.
As a former HAZMAT officer for my biology department, I read Sture’s book earlier for background on safe use of the many hazardous bacteria and chemicals we use in teaching and research. But our recent political and unjustified charges of “dual use” brought me back to re-examine her definition of “dual us.”
While it is possible to declare an agent always harmful, as in the case of the sarin nerve gas, there are other agents with important civil uses that can also be used in war, such as chlorine. On the good side, chlorine is critical for use to sterilize clothing, hospital instruments and surgical rooms. On the other side, it was used in deadly gas warfare in World War I at Ypres in April 1915, and more recently in Syria.
Another dilemma is separating “pepper sprays” and other riot control gases from higher concentrated fatal levels. This recently occurred on May 1 when the U.S. accused Russia of violating the international chemical weapons ban by using chloropicrin, a choking agent, against Ukrainian troops.
Sture addresses real instances of dual use in warfare. “Dual use” is use of a benign or beneficial discovery or product for hostile purposes. Sture clarifies that the science or product is not the danger, but the people who misuse it are.
In ethics classes, dual use is sometimes illustrated by a knife: critical in food preparation, a knife can also kill a person. The co-discoverer of penicillin, E.B. Chain, explained: “Of course almost any kind of research, however academic, and almost any invention, however beneficial to mankind, from the knife to atomic energy, from anesthetics to plant hormones, can be used for war or other destructive purposes, but it is, of course, not the scientist and inventor who carries the responsibility for how the results of his research or his inventions are used.”
That did not dissuade the U.S. from conducting substantial chemical and biological warfare research and stockpiling until the a signing of the Chemicals Weapons Convention (CWC) and Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention (BTWC). Until then, the U.S. conducted substantial chemical and biological warfare research at Fort Detrick and other secret facilities. Our extensive history of chemical and bioweapons research can be viewed on “NOVA: Bioterror.”
Our “dual use” problem occurred with the use of the mixture of 2,4,5-T and 2,4-D, named “Agent Orange.” It was forbidden by Eisenhower and Truman in the Korean War, but then approved by Kennedy in Vietnam. A known defoliant, if 2,4,5-T rises above 160°C it transforms into deadly tetrachlorodioxin. In addition, small quantities of dioxin cause many problems including malformed babies. 2,4,5-T is now illegal in the U.S. But aside from the 3.1 million Vietnam War casualties, malformed babies from the dioxin continue to cause more casualties in Vietnam today.
The Geneva Protocol of 1925 preventing the use in war of asphyxiating, poisonous or other gasses, and of all analogous liquids, materials or devices, was never ratified by the U.S.
When the U.S. ratified the CWC in 1997, the U.S. had massive stockpiles of chemical weapons exceeding 30,000 tons of chemical warfare agents including 780,000 mustard agent-filled projectiles. Our last sarin nerve agent-filled M55 rocket was destroyed at the Blue Grass Army Depot in Kentucky on July 7, 2023—26 years later!
A few days ago, French President Macron recently thanked President Xi for what he called a commitment “to abstain from selling any arms to Moscow and strictly control the exports of dual-use goods.” Macron did his homework. Biden and Blinken did not.
